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If hermeneutics has obtained remarkable 
results in the field of arts, philosophy, lite-
rature and every other field that operates 
with symbols, why not bring it in the field 
of economics as well? Economic herme-
neutics starts, first, from the premise of 
the economic knowledge relativity. Se-
condly, a correct interpretation requires 
appropriate techniques for researching 
causal relations. Thirdly, explanation and 
prediction give the consistency of inter-
pretation, because the explanation is the 
one to make a phenomenon easy to un-
derstand by revealing the causes of its 
rise, and the prediction anticipates the re-
sult, starting from the original phenome-
na, the ones that are expected to happen, 
and the laws governing them. Fourthly, 
the argumentation is meant to persuade 
others, in a rational way, that the interpre-
tation is correct. This paper presents a 
synthesis of the systematic character of 
the economic hermeneutics. The arguments favoring economic 
hermeneutics are not intended to suggest that we pursue the 
completion of the construction of hermeneutics. We are aware 
of the limitations of the approach. But we would take pleasure 
in raising future debates and pursue new ideas concerning the 
present analysis, at least awaking the interest of others ex-
pecting this way new developments on the analyzed issue. 
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I.  History 
Hermeneutics (in Greek having the meaning “to inter-
pret”, “to translate”) represents in the philosophy the me-
thodology of interpretation and understanding of texts.
Over time, hermeneutics became a general theory of the
rules of interpretation, a theoretical reflection on the work
of interpretation. Ion Coordonescu1 states that the perma-
nent character of decoding should be taken into conside-
ration in the hermeneutical process, which would mean
that interpretation exists only where there is a hidden
meaning. There are two guidelines on hermeneutics, the
task and its possibilities. Thus, Schleiermacher considers
hermeneutics as being an art which establishes the clear
rules of interpretation. It envisages the normative nature of
hermeneutics. For others, such as Martin Heidegger, Paul
Ricoeur, hermeneutics must give up this ideal of the norm
and become a phenomenology - a reflection on the phe-
nomenon of interpretation. In philosophy, hermeneutics is
not a marginal subject, but a key one - the transformation
of what is obscure in clear expressions. 
In the twentieth century, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derida
highlighted the universal character of hermeneutics.
Understanding is a human-specific faculty, as well as
thinking is. Hermeneutics is a subject similar to logic or
                                                 
1 
 Coordonescu, Ion, Lecture on hermeneutics, http://facultate.religielive.ro.
See also: Ţurlea, Marin, Lăzăroiu, George, Carpeanu, Andrei, Analysis
and interpretation in recent philosophy, Cartea Universitară Publishing
House, 2003; Vattimo, Gianni, Beyond Interpretation, Pontica
Publishing House, 2003; Wurtz, Bruno, Hermeneutics of Gadamer,
Timisoara, 1985; Schleiermacher, FDE, Hermeneutics, Polirom Pu-
blishing House, 2001; Hufnagel, Erwin, Introduction to Hermeneutics,
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psychology. Discussions on the subject exist currently2 but 
from an economic perspective we try to simplify things 
                                                 
2
 In modern approaches to hermeneutics it is not about the interpretation 
itself, but the science of provisions, of object and means of interpretation, 
of ways to communicate, interpret and apply practically. The purpose of 
the interpretative act is the understanding, which has contextualization as 
main mediator. We consider interpretation as being a set of rules which 
argues the interpretive experience, as well as a good application, adapted 
to the principles and general laws which hermeneutics comprises as 
theory. Interpretation is intransitive, of recognition, - whose aim regards 
the understanding of itself, transitive – whose purpose is to make itself 
understood, and prescriptive or dogmatic, as the legal and theological 
one, whose purpose is the regulation of fulfillment. Hermeneutics is both 
synchronous, when given the predominance search for the systematic 
character, and diachronic, when the historic character prevails. Hermene-
utics aims at: the correct composition of performance, meaning, circums-
tances, order and relationship between the integrative parties; the identi-
fication of critical resources, both rhetorical and logical; communication, 
argumentation, theoretical and practical use.  
See Mauricio Beuchot Puente, Analogous Hermeneutics, Paideia Publi-
considering that economic hermeneutics is the science of 
interpreting economic phenomena and processes based 
on: explanation, prediction, reasoning and argument.  The 
economic hermeneutics, in the meaning that we assign to 
it, not been addressed yet. It is true that the economic 
analysis has taken over some of the attributes of herme-
neutics. But we believe that the time has come for the 
economic hermeneutics to build the principles and rules 
that guide the interpretation, on the one hand, and the 
methods of their application regarding the interpretation 
of the economic phenomena, on the other hand. Thus it 
will have the ability to understand, explain and picture the 
meaning of the economic phenomena. 
                                                                                  
shing House, Bucharest 2007; Martin Heidegger, Ontology of Factuality 
Hermeneutics, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995; Umberto 
Eco, The limits of interpretation, Polirom Publishing House, 2007, Stefan 
Georgescu, Epistemology, Bucharest, 1978. 
 
  
Figure 1. The structure of the hermeneutic process 
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II. The Development of the Theme 
The hermeneutical process includes the proper interpreta-
tion, the objective of the interpretation and the turning ac-
count of the interpretation (Figure 1). 
The hermeneutical process is a complex act that involves:  
•  the question requires an interpretative response: 
What is the meaning of the economic phenome-
non?, We do we want to find out?, Who is the user 
of information? 
•  making hypothetical judgments, assumptions to ad-
dress a question; 
•  verifying the hypothesis through analysis and value 
judgments, to convert the hypothesis into a thesis; 
•  the argumentation of the thesis by a modus ponens 
process [((p → q) & p) → q], or modus tollens pro-
cess [((p → q) & ~ q) → ~ p], abduction or retro-
duction [((p → q) & q) → p]. The argument serves 
to make "another one" believe the undertaken in-
terpretation; 
•  the capitalization of the thesis through the explana-
tion of the analyzed phenomenon’s perspective 
and the generalization toward other phenomena. 
The question must be as clear as not to create ambiguities. 
The question/questions are intended to acquire the de-
scription of the economic phenomenon: causality, beha-
vior and its dynamics. The causal analysis is done with the 
tools of the economic analysis and seeks to identify the fac-
tors of influence, their direction and size. There is also ac-
complished their grouping based on persistence over time. 
Predictions are made and thesis issued to be substan-
tiated. 
There is a sense of the economic process’ hermeneutics 
beginning from the question what? going through what? 




What? – Increasing the stock of finished products.  
Due to – the sales index slips ahead of production. 
Because – the pace of manufacture is not related to the 
pace of sales. 
Because – production programming. 
   
Figure 3. The logic of argumentation 
 
  
Figure 2. The logic of the questions in  





Figure 4. The logic of the hermeneutics of an economic process 
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What? – Liquidity decreases. 
Due to – sales index slips ahead the index of earnings. 
Because – the rotational speed of customer credit was 
decreased. 
Due to – increasing competition on the market. 
Unlike the interpretation, the argumentation is a reverse 
process. 
Example:  
If – competition increases.  
Then – the terms of the bills’ receipt relax. 
Therefore – the speed of credit rotation is reduced. 
In consequence – the index of revenues slips forward 
the index of sales. 
Explanation and prediction: 
A. The meaning of the explanation and prediction: 
The explanation aims at making easy to understand a 
phenomenon, process or event by revealing the genera-
ting causes. Its specificity is that it takes place after the 
taking place of the “event” and consists of the reconstruc-
tion, going in the opposite direction of time passing by, or 
of antecedents that led to the event that we want to ex-
plain. It occurs usually in response to the question why? 
Why did exchange rate of the currency increase at the 
same time as the budget deficit did? Why did exports fall 
when the exchange rate increased? Why did the turnover 
increase when prices decreased and the product quality 
increased?  
By explaining we establish links between the economic 
phenomena and processes previously carried on domain-
specific laws. Addressing the explanation as function of 
the scientific theory can be found at many authors3.  
For example, Hempel distinguishes a sentence E is any 
explanation, describing the phenomenon to be explained 
(explanandum), and a set of propositions which serve to 
explain (explanans). The rule of ogical suitability is that 
any explanandum must be a consequence of the proposi-
tions that make up the explanans. Hempel's scheme is as 
follows4 (Figure 5). 
                                                 
3 Ducasse C. J., Explanation, mechanism and teleology, 1925; Karl R. 
Popper, Logik der Forschung, 1934; Carl G. Hemplel, Aspect of Scientific 
explanation, The Free Press, 1965; Popa C., Structura şi funcţiile teoriei 
stiinţifice, in vol: Theory and experiment, 1971, p. 61. 
4
 According to Popa C., quoted work., p. 66. 
The explanation, according to Hempel, is not a formal 
conclusion, but an argument that uses concepts with pre-
cise meaning. According to him the object of the explana-
tion are not abstract entities, but real phenomena, of 
whose existence he raises no doubt. 
Hempel extends the validity of the model upon the predic-
tion. For him, from a logical standpoint, there is no differ-
ence. Differences arise only from a pragmatic perspective, 
consisting of the position in time of the connoisseur sub-
ject, who, in case of a prediction, says something about an 
event before its occurance, while in the case of the expla-
nation (s)he says something about the history of the event 
after it has taken place. 
There are other points of view such as the one of Israel 
Scheffler at Harvard University5. The existence of a com-
mon scheme for deductive explanation and prediction 
does not justify the identifying of the logical structure of 
explanation and prediction in all cases. Not any predictive 
basis justifying the acceptance of propositions concerning 
future events is at the same time also an explanation of 
them. Even if the predictions have happened, the ele-
ments used as a basis for the prediction do not become 
explanation of the phenomenon, as the explanation re-
quires the use of general laws or at least of some genera-
lized assessments of statistical nature, which may be ab-
sent in some cases of prediction. Scheffler introduces 
some constraints including the possibility that some of the 
explanations may contain false sentences and so the en-
tire explanation to become false. Cornel Popa does not 
share this limitation of Scheffler’s point of view, about 
which he states: “We cannot agree with relinquishing the 
request regarding the truth of the sentences used as a 
basis for the prediction or explanation, because it would 
undermine, in the case of sentences in the field of expe-
rimental sciences, the distinction between truth and false 
both in the case of the premises and of the explicandum 
conclusion. In addition to the distinction, even relative, 
perfectible, etc., between truth and false science becomes 
impossible”6. 
From the hermeneutical perspective the relation between 
explanation and prediction must be addressed as follows: 
                                                 
5 Israel Schefler, The anatomy of inquiry, Routledg Kegan Paul, 1964, 
(according to Popa C., quoted work., p. 68). 
6
 Popa C., Structure and functions of scientific theory, in vol: Theory and 




Figure 5. The logic of the hermeneutics of an economic process 
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•  in case of the explanation the “C” consequence oc-
curred because there were initial "S" phenomena, 
”U” phenomena occurred further and all happened 
under the“L” laws (the result / consequence). So, 
the result is explained by assumptions (initial and 
subsequent acts) and by governing laws. With re-
gard to time, the result is based on events that 
took place, even itself (the result) being an accom-
plished fact. Its truth depends on the ability of the 
interpreter to understand and assert correctly the 
premises. The objective existence of the conse-
quence cannot be questioned. What can be dis-
cussed is its correct perception; 
•  the prediction anticipates the result starting from the 
initial phenomena, those which are expected to un-
fold and from the laws governing them. So, in terms 
of time, the prediction is based on something that 
happened, but also on something that will happen. 
Its truth depends on the ability of the interpreter to 
understand what happened, rely on the insight re-
garding what will happen, and to correctly assert 
what happened and what (s)he inferred; 
•  from what has been presented above results that 
both the explanation and the prediction have a de-
gree of relativity. If, in the case of the explanation, 
the degree of relativity is given by the capacity of 
perceiving what has happened, in the case of pre-
diction the unforeseen occurs as well. Otherwise we 
should accept the existence of the absolute truth; 
•  the level and depth of an explanation depends on 
both the theoretical apparatus used and the fine-
ness and accuracy of "measurements" made for set-
ting the antecedent terms of the explanation. In the 
case of prediction the unforeseen occurs in addition. 
In conclusion, we understand the explanation and the 
prediction of the economic phenomena and processes as: 
Explanation: 
•  we dispose of a set of economic phenomena origi-
nally known: 
12 [ , ,....., ] n s ss S = ; 
•  we dispose of a set of economic laws which govern 
the known economic phenomena: 
12 [ , ,....., ] n ll l L = ; 
•  we dispose of a set of economic phenomena which 
occurred subsequently to initial phenomena, but 
before the present time:  12 [ , ,....., ] n uu u U = ; 
•  we dispose of a set of consequences generated by 
initial and subsequent phenomena governed by the 
“L” laws:  12 [ , ,....., ] n cc c C = ; 
The explanation consists actually of asserting the syllogism: 
  If : S 
        And : L, U 
  Then : C 
      C U L S → ∃ , ,  
Prediction:  unlike the explanation, the prediction antic-
ipates the conclusion before the occurrence of “U”: 
,( ) SL U C ∃→  → : if “S” and “L”  
then possible “C” if there occurs “U”. 
The initial phenomena are very diverse depending on the 
plateau of discourse analysis and perspective. For exam-






Figure 6. Explanation and prediction (foresight–trend approach) 
 
Symbols: 
E – events;  LGN – new governing laws; 
P – processes;  CP – predictable consequence; 
LG – governing laws;  EX – explanation; 
C – consequence;  PR – prediction; 
EP – possible events;  N – unforseen; 
PP – possible processes;  T – trends;  Gheorghe BĂILEŞTEANU 
quidity in the national or global economic system; the NBR 
reference interest rate – high or low; the demand – high 
or low, etc. The laws governing these phenomena can be 
worded as follows: if there is lack of liquidity, the economy 
is underfunded, the growth rate declining; if the reference 
interest rate increases, the cost of money increases lea-
ding to a decline in the volume of loans, etc.  Subsequent 
phenomena may be, in this case, the decrease of the NBR 
reference interest rate; the increase of liquidity in the 
economy through foreign loans, etc. The consequences 
would be increasing the amount of the credit sought by 
the economic agents, the economic recovery, etc. 
Explanation and prediction do not always have the same 
result even if the premises are the same. For the present 
case the conclusion of the NBR prediction was not con-
firmed. Although the reference interest rate was de-
creased and an IMF loan of around 20 billion dollars (year 
2009) was called upon, it was found that the volume of 
loans did not increase (due to policies pursued by banks 
and to inconsistencies in government ruling). 
Hermeneutics requires a history of the explanations as 
basis for predictions. 
In the case of the foresight the past events will be ex-
plained starting with the ones that happened, the gover-
ning laws and the consequences that occurred. Actually, a 
picture of the past is being accomplished. Starting from 
the past, the trends are outlined and predictions are made 
based on them. It is a view from the past toward the fu-
ture. In the case of the visioning interventions are under-
taken upon the past by corrections leading toward a cor-
rected consequence which will be the base for any new 
trends. Actions will be taken through options regarding the 
future, thus resulting the desirable consequence. It is 
about a prediction from the future toward the present. 
A.  The meaning of argumentation: 
In the modern theory a two-way approach to argumenta-
tion was shaped:  
•  the tendency to overlap logic and argumentation, if 
not entirely, then at least partly (especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon literature), as well as equating the two 
fundamental concepts: reasoning and argumenta-
tion7. "When we use arguments, we try to convince 
others in a rational way by analyzing the evidence 
or reasons that build our point of view. The evi-
dence or grounds are called premises and the de-
fended point of view is called conclusion8. It is an 
accurate as possible description of the reasoning in 
the classical logic; 
•  the tendency to oppose the argument, the formal 
logic. The argumentation theory is considered more 
as  informal logic9. Argumentation cannot be 
understood as a strict relationship between produ-
                                                 
7 Stephen F. Barker, The Elements of Logic, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
New York, 1965, p. 7; Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1953, p. 4; Patrick Suppes, Introduction to Logic, 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York, 1957 p. XVIII; Morris S. 
Engel,  With Good Reason: An Introduction to Informal Fallacies, St. 
Martin’s Press New York, 1976, p. 6. 
8 Trudy Govier, quoted work., p. 1. 
9 Brair J. A., Johnson R. H. (coordinator), Informal Logic: the first 
international symposium, Edgepress, Ireverness, 1980; Informal Logic: 
Reasoning and Argumentation în Theory Practice (Editor: Anthony J. 






Figure 7. Explanation and prediction (visionary approach – visioning) 
 
Symbols: 
CC – reclaimed consequence;  T – trends. 
CD – desired consequence;   HERMENEUTICS  AND  ECONOMICS 
 
cing speakers’ evidence and taking responsibility 
on a thesis by the interlocutor/ dialogue partner, 
b u t  a s  a  di s cu r s i v e  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  m o n o -
logue, dialogue or even in the form of a multiple 
dialogue. “Given this point of view, the argumenta-
tion is seen as a set-up of arguments, well-ordered 
by criteria of argumentative efficiency, and which 
only together can provide the interlocutor’s convic-
tion (...) the emphasis falls not on the contingency 
strength of each argument, but on how each argu-
ment participates in the accomplishing of the entire 
argumentative purpose”10. 
In our opinion hermeneutics is related to the argumenta-
tion, especially to rhetorics, in the sense that we must 
agree upon our interpretation. This is because others may 
not accept our interpretative proposal. Therefore, even if 
the argument does not lead to the purest truth, but to a 
plausible one, or at least a credible one, argumentation is 
mandatory. 
From an economic perspective the argument must be 
seen as: economic arguments which are based on logical 
reasoning because any argument is an organization of 
reasoning, if reasoning is a purely logical approach, in ab-
soluto (disregarding the practical significance), the argu-
ment is, moreover, an approach in concreto; the economic 
arguments pursues an objective and is therefore con-
nected with praxis; economic argumentation has a pre-
dominant social function through the effects it has on in-
dividuals and groups with whom contact is established. 
Therefore it has moral, psychological and communica-
tional valences – upon the economic argument the eco-
nomic hermeneutics can be built as a science for the in-
terpretation of economic phenomena. 
The relation between reasoning, argumentation and inter-
pretation we can only imagine this way (Figure 8):  
 
The logically investigated reasoning is not concerned with 
the practical accuracy but only with the absolute one. Re-
garding the operating conditions and fairness as a fact the 
argumentation will be the one bearing responsibility.  
                                                 
10
Constantin  Sălăvastru,  Theory and practice of argumentation, Iaşi, 
2003, p. 27. 
In the process of argumentation we have one or more 
backgrounds ( e v i d e n c e )  t o  s u p p o r t  a  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  i s  
called thesis (Figure 9): 
 
1. When the market share increases the competitive posi-
tion of the enterprise is improving.  
The market share of the enterprise increased.  
2. When the enterprise’s competitive position is improving 
the negotiation conditions on the market relax.  
The enterprise’s competitive position has improved.  
Therefore: the negotiation conditions on the market (cus-
tomers, suppliers, banks) relax.  
3. When the negotiation conditions on the market relax 
the terms for product and service delivery relax as well. 
The negotiation conditions on the market relax.  
Therefore: the terms for product and service delivery relax. 
III. Conclusion 
Economic hermeneutics starts, first, from the premise of 
the economic knowledge relativity. Secondly, a correct in-
terpretation requires appropriate techniques for re-
searching causal relations. Thirdly, explanation and pre-
diction give the consistency of interpretation, because the 
explanation is the one to make a phenomenon easy to 
understand by revealing the causes of its rise, and the 
prediction anticipates the result, starting from the original 
phenomena, the ones that are expected to happen, and 
the laws governing them. Fourthly, the argumentation is 
meant to persuade others, in a rational way, that the in-
terpretation is correct. Figure 10 presents a summary of 
the systematic character of the economic hermeneutics. 
  




Figure 8. The relation between reasoning, 
argumentation and interpretation 
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Figure 10. The systematics of the economic hermeneutics 
Symbols: 
SHE – systematics of the economic hermeneutics;  ARG – argumentation;  EXP – explanation; 
RCE – relativity of economic knowledge;  RE – economic reasoning;  PRD – prediction; 
TCR – techniques for the research of causal relations;  I – hypothesis; O – options;  C – consequence. 